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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND PRESERVED FOR APPEAL 
1. Can summary judgment be based upon a movant's statement of 
undisputed material facts which fails to comply with CJA Rule 4-501(2)(a)? 
Appellant did not object below to Appellee's failure to comply with CJA Rule 
4-501(2)(a). However, Appellant did not have to make this objection in order to preserve 
this issue for appeal. CJA Rule 4-501 (2)(b) expressly provides that in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment, the trial court cannot deem facts admitted in favor of the movant unless 
the movant has first submitted a statement of undisputed material facts which complies with 
CJA Rule 4-501 (2)(a). This language is mandatory upon the trial court and cannot be waived 
by the parties. 
2. Was there a reasonable necessity for the requested easement at the time 
of severance? 
Preserved in appellate record at 7, 47 & 77 ("R. "). 
3. Was there sufficient evidence in the record to show whether the canal 
company's alleged denial of Roach' right to bridge the canal was reasonable? 
Preserved at R. 9 & 59. 
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STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The appropriate standard of review for all of the foregoing issues is de novo. 
In considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court construes all 
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether 
there exists any genuine issue of material fact. No deference is given to the trial court's 
conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE RULE: CODE OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION RULE 4-501(2) 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in 
support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise 
statement of material facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts 
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of 
the record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a 
concise statement of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. 
Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer 
to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall 
state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All 
material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate 
reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment 
unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
CJA Rule 4-501(2). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case 
The purpose of this appeal is to determine whether the trial court erred in 
granting, on motion for summary judgment, an easement by implication and necessity. 
B. Procedural Background 
Plaintiff/Appellee Paul J. Roach ("Roach") commenced this action by filing a 
complaint against Defendant/Appellant Deanne R. Jex ("Jex") seeking an easement by 
implication and necessity across Jex's property. R. 1-5. Jex answered the complaint 
alleging, among other things, that there was no reasonable necessity for the requested 
easement. R. 7-10. 
Thereafter, Roach filed a motion for summary judgment. R. 33-34. In 
support of his motion for summary judgment, Roach filed his own affidavit, R. 25-29, and 
the affidavit of J. Merrill Hallam, president of the East Bench Canal Company. R. 31-32. 
Jex opposed the motion for summary judgment. R. 35-49. In support of her 
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Jex filed her own affidavit, R. 58-60, and 
the affidavit of Bryan Jex, her husband. R. 69-70. 
A hearing was conducted on the motion for summary judgment on April 6, 
1993. R. 67, 111.1. On April 22, 1993, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision 
granting Roach an easement by implication and necessity across Jex's property. R. 75-78. 
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Thereafter, the parties were unable to agree as to the proper location of the 
easement granted. Each party filed additional affidavits relating to the location dispute. 
R. 87-101.3. 
A hearing was conducted on August 24, 1993 to resolve the location dispute. 
R. 86, 102. On September 24, 1993, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision 
determining the location of the easement. R. 103-104. 
On March 21, 1994, a final Order and Judgment was entered by the trial 
court. R. 109-1 ll.1 ' It is from this Order and Judgment which Jex appeals. Jex, however, 
appeals only that portion of the Order and Judgment granting the easement. Jex does not 
appeal the location of the easement if the grant of the easement should be upheld. 
C. Factual Background 
Jex and Roach are sister and brother and are the only heirs to the estate of 
their father, Walter Dean Roach. R. 28, 60. The estate of Walter Dean Roach was divided 
in probate between Jex and Roach in November, 1981. R. 4. 
As a result of this division, Jex and Roach each received a parcel of real 
property. R. 4. Simultaneous to this division, Roach leased from Jex the parcel which Jex 
received. R. 28. 
- A copy of the trial court's Order and Judgment, filed March 21, 1994, is attached hereto as Addendum "A." 
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These parcels are adjacent to one another and are located near Spanish Fork in 
Utah County, State of Utah. R. 4, 25-29. An aerial photograph identifying the two parcels 
is attached hereto as part of Addendum "B."-7 
Roach's parcel lies to the west of Jex's parcel. Both parcels are bounded to 
the north by State Road 147. R. 4, 25-29. An irrigation canal runs diagonally through 
Roach's parcel from south to north, dividing it into northwestern and southeastern sections. 
R. 3, 25-29. While the northwestern section of Roach's parcel is accessible from State Road 
147, access to the southeastern section of Roach's parcel requires either bridging the canal 
from the north or traversing Jex's parcel from the east. R. 18. 
Access to the southeastern section of Roach's parcel had previously been 
obtained by traversing Jex's parcel from the east. R. 25-29. This means of access began 
back when the parcels were owned as a single unit by Walter Dean Roach. R. 28. After the 
unit was divided in November 1981, this means of access continued pursuant to the lease 
between Roach and Jex. R. 27-28. When the lease between Roach and Jex was terminated 
in or about late 1991 or early 1992, Jex denied Roach access across her parcel. R. 27-28. 
At or about this same time, Roach bridged the canal. R. 69. Roach no longer traverses 
Jex's parcel in order to access the southeastern section of his parcel, using instead the bridge 
which he constructed. R. 69. 
- This aerial photograph is an exhibit to the Affidavit of Paul J. Roach, filed January 11, 1993, which is attached 
hereto as Addendum "B." 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court should have denied Roach's motion for summary 
judgment because of Roach's failure to comply CJA Rule 4-501 (2)(a). Roach's statement of 
undisputed material facts neither set forth material factual allegations sufficient to establish 
his causes of action nor contained the requisite citations to the record. The trial court could 
only deem admitted those material factual allegations which were both included in Roach's 
statement of undisputed material facts and properly supported by an accurate citation to the 
record. Since Roach failed to present any such factual allegations, there was no basis upon 
which the trial court could grant Roach's motion for summary judgment. 
2. The trial court should have denied Roach's motion for summary 
judgment because there was no reasonable necessity for the requested easement at the time 
when unity of title was severed. At the time when unity of title was severed, alternate access 
to the southeastern section of Roach's parcel was reasonably available via the leasehold 
interest which Roach held in the Jex parcel. Alternatively, the trial court should have denied 
Roach's motion for summary judgment because a question of fact was raised as to whether 
alternate access to the southeastern section of Roach's parcel was reasonably available by 
bridging the canal. The undisputed evidence shows that Roach bridged the canal in late 1991 
or early 1992 and has been using that bridge to access the southeastern section of his parcel 
ever since. 
3. The trial court should have denied Roach's motion for summary 
judgment because there was insufficient evidence in the record to show that the canal 
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company's denial of Roach's right to bridge the canal was reasonable. Utah law requires a 
canal owner to give a land owner reasonable a justification before denying a land owner 
access to his land. The canal company in this case testified only about damage to the canal 
resulting from attempts to bridge the canal on other properties. There was no evidence 
presented as to the degree of this damage or whether the same damage should be expected to 
occur on Roach's property. Thus, it was impossible for the trial court to determine, as a 
matter of law, that the canal company's denial of the right to bridge the canal in this case 
was reasonable. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE WAS NO STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS IN 
THE RECORD UPON WHICH SUMMARY JUDGMENT COULD BE BASED. 
A. CJA Rule 4-501(2) Requires The Movant To Submit A Complete 
And Properly Supported Statement Of Material Facts In Order To 
Obtain Summary Judgment. 
Rule 4-501(2)(a) of the Code of Judicial Administration sets forth the 
applicable requirements for presenting a memorandum in support of a motion for summary 
judgment: 
The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary 
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise 
statement of material facts as to which movant contends no 
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions 
of the record upon which the movant relies. 
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Rule 4-501 (2)(b) of the Code of Judicial Administration sets forth the 
applicable requirements for presenting a memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment: 
The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a 
concise statement of material facts as to which the party 
contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer 
to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party 
relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or 
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All material 
facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported 
by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted 
for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
When read as a whole, CJA Rule 4-501(2) places the burden upon the movant 
to present and support in his statement of undisputed material facts all undisputed material 
facts necessary to prevail on the motion for summary judgment. The nonmovant is required 
to contest only those material facts which are both included in the movant's statement of 
undisputed material facts and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record. If 
the movant should fail to submit a complete statement of undisputed material facts or 
properly support one or more of the material facts included in his statement of undisputed 
material facts, then summary judgment cannot be granted. 
This conclusion is expressly supported by last sentence of CJA 4-501 (2)(b): 
. . . All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and 
properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall 
be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment 
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unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's 
statement. 
CJA Rule 4-501(2)(b) (italics added). In other words, the trial court may only deem a 
movant's material factual allegations admitted when they are: (1) included in the movant's 
statement of undisputed material facts; (2) properly supported by an accurate reference to the 
record; and (3) not specifically controverted by the nonmovant's statement of disputed facts. 
B. Roach Failed To Submit A Complete Statement Of Undisputed 
Material Facts. 
In order to prevail on his motion for summary judgment, Roach had to set 
forth in his statement of undisputed material facts, factual allegations sufficient to satisfy 
each of the requisite elements of his two causes of action. The four elements necessary to 
establish an easement by implication are: (1) unity of title followed by severance of title; (2) 
that the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible at the time of severance; (3) that the 
easement was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; and (4) that the 
use of the easement was continuous. Butler v. Lee, 11r4 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). The two elements necessary to establish an easement by necessity are: (1) unity of 
title followed by severance of title; and (2) that the easement was, and remains, reasonably 
necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate. Tschaggeny v. Union Pacific Land 
Resources Corp., 555 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1976); Dahnken v. George Romney & Sons Co., 
184 P.2d 211, 216 (Utah 1947). 
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In his "Statement of Undisputed Facts", Roach sets forth five paragraphs of 
factual allegations. R. 23-24.-; These factual allegations relate only to the second and 
fourth elements necessary to establish an easement by implication. Id. Roach fails to 
include any factual allegations relating to either the first and third elements necessary to 
establish an easement by implication or any of the elements necessary to establish an 
easement by necessity. Id.-
C. The Few Factual Allegations Which Roach Did Submit Failed To 
Include Citations To The Record. 
Besides failing to set forth all of the factual allegations necessary to establish 
his two causes of action, Roach failed to include in his Statement of Undisputed Facts the 
requisite citations to the record. None of the five factual allegations which were included in 
Roach's Statement of Undisputed Facts contains a supporting citation to the record. R. 23-
24. 
D. The Trial Court Erred When It Ignored Roach's Failure Comply 
With CJA Rule 4-501(2) And Granted Summary Judgment Based 
Upon Improperly Deemed Admissions. 
In its Memorandum Decision of April 22, 1993 (the "April Memorandum 
Decision"), the trial court held: 
- A copy of Roach's Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 11, 1993, 
is attached hereto as Addendum "C." 
- Roach's Statement of Undisputed Facts contains five separately numbered paragraphs which begin with number 1, 
then jump to number 8, then proceed in sequence to number 11. R. 23-24. It obvious from the numbering of these 
paragraphs, as well as the numbering of the pages on which they appear, that an entire page of Roach's Statement of 
Undisputed Facts is missing from the record Id. This missing page appears to have been page 2, which presumably 
contained factual allegations 2 through 7. Id. 
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 lKuacii| IIJLL set 
forth suiiiv i- \dc\-- ti . -!.,- -,i. U^K . jment [of his two causes 
of action]. Each factual assertion is supported by specific 
reference to affidavits and deposition testimony. In response, 
[Jex] has failed to adequately or competently refute any of 
[Roach's] material allegations of fact establishing his right of 
way. Her "Statement of Facts" is wholly unsupported by any 
reference to the record. Furthermore, in her Statement of Facts, 
1
 admits the first required element, i.e., unity of title 
' ^ severance, and fails to set forth any specific facts to 
le assertion that the servitude was apparent, obvious, 
and visible at the time of severance, or that the use of the 
easement was continuous rather than sporadic Therefore, 
pursuant to Rule 4-501(2)(b) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, [Roach's] assertions of fact relating ' <• t 
second and fourth elements cited above must also be ^^Aicd 
admn-v 
R 77,^ 
This incredible April Memorandum Decision, which formed the basis of the 
trial court's later Order and Judgment granting the requested easement, is replete with err 
Roach's Statement of Undisputed Facts did not set forth sufficient facts to establish each 
element of his two causes of action Nor were any of the factual assertions in Roach's 
Slafcmciil id I lri(lis|iiifi nl I ti Is ^iipp^rh'il In specific reference to affidavits and deposition 
testimony. 
Tin. Apnl Mi inn1 "*'•""! IVi i s n MI in ill < nrlli i li (lie dull nil! s 
misinterpretation of CJA Rule 4-501 (2Hh) Roach's failure to comply with CJA Rule 4-
501(2)(a) rendered his Statement o: * . al hit is a iinllih JIHI It ' s ii'spunsc ihuiefo 
- A copy of the trial court's April Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Addei 
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irrelevant. Under no circumstances did the trial court have authority under CJA Rule 4-
501(2)(b) to deem Roach's unsubmitted and unsupported factual allegations admitted. 
In sum, there was simply no statement of undisputed material facts in the 
record upon which summary judgment could be based. 
n. THERE WAS NO REASONABLE NECESSITY FOR REQUESTED EASEMENT 
AT THE TIME WHEN UNITY OF TITLE WAS SEVERED, OR, AT THE 
VERY LEAST, THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT AS TO WHETHER IT 
WAS REASONABLY NECESSARY. 
One of the elements essential to establishing either an easement by implication 
or necessity is that it must have been reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant 
estate at the time when unity of title was severed. Tschaggeny, 555 P.2d at 280; see also 
Savage v. Nielsen, 197 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah 1948) ("A way of necessity arises from the 
existence of such necessity at the time of the dividing of the property"); Butler, 11A P.2d at 
1152. If alternate access to the dominant estate is reasonably available at the time of 
severance, then a reasonable necessity for the requested easement cannot be shown. See 
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981); Butler, 11A P.2d at 1154. Here, there 
was no reasonable necessity for the requested easement at the time of severance because 
alternate access to the southeastern section of Roach's parcel was reasonably available. 
Alternatively, there is at least a question of fact as to whether alternate access to the 
southeastern section of Roach's parcel was reasonably available at the time of severance. 
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A Roach Had Access To The Southeastern Section Of His Parcel Via 
Ihe I,easehold Interest Which He Held At The Time Of Severance. 
Roach. adh...a d ^:. JP.:. . *. --
in the Jex parcel. R. 28. Roach's leasehold interest permitted him ;** ra\erse the Jex parcel 
in order to access the southeastern section ~f Hc r^T ,
 M... -asonable 
access f" U" xiiiiin'.isd'fii ^ tn->n nt |n>< p;ipri at the time of severance via this leasehold 
interest, there was no reasonable necessity for the requested easement at that time. 
B. Roach's Subsequent Construction And Use u i A unogt 
The Southeastern Section Of His Parcel Raises At Least A Question 
Of Fact As To Whether An Easement Was Reasonably Necessary. 
In or about i;ik: l*W| 01 eailv l"w'-" N">" I" * '»n\lib» u J .• b ini^ auuss the 
canal which divides his property. R. 69.-' Roach now uses this bridge to access the 
southeastern section of his parcel Id. Roach no longer traverses Jex's parcel in order to 
access the southeastern se :tion c f his parce 1 Id. 
Jex. submitted this evidence to the trial court for the purpose of showing that 
alternate J: :*•• * i-a-u n: ^ •• « -h r= nr •-. 
available by bridging tin van.;- 1 c trial court Iiowevei. _:ed that tins evidence was 
The fact that [Roach] built a bridge across the canal and has 
used it foi the past year for access to his property is inadequate 
to refute the affidavit of J. Merrill Hallam that the canal 
- A copy of the Affidavit <**' »-,•«» ! < ; ,lii!ii "E." 
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company refuses to allow [Roach] permission to build a bridge 
across the canal. 
R. 110. 
The problem with this ruling is that it makes no sense. How could the trial 
court find, as a matter of law, that the canal company refuses to allow Roach to bridge the 
canal while acknowledging that Roach has already bridged the canal and has been using that 
bridge to access his property since in or about late 1991 or early 1992? 
Obviously, a question of material fact remains as to whether alternate access 
was reasonably available by bridging the canal. The trial court could not grant summary 
judgment in the face of this unresolved question of material fact. 
III. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT THE CANAL 
COMPANY'S ALLEGED DENIAL OF ROACH'S RIGHT TO BRIDGE 
THE CANAL WAS REASONABLE. 
Jex testified: "The East Bench [Canal] Company has permitted bridging across 
its canal in numerous locations and as long as my brother meets the permit requirements, he 
can bridge the canal for access to his property . . . ." R. 59 (italics added)2'. This 
testimony was introduced to rebut the testimony of J. Merrill Hallam, who testified that 
under no circumstances would the canal company permit Roach to bridge the canal, even if 
done according to its specifications. R. 31.-; 
- A copy of the Affidavit of Deanne Jex, filed February 22, 1993, is attached hereto as Addendum "F." * 
-
;
 A copy of the Affidavit of J. Merrill Hallam, filed January 11, 1993, is attached hereto as Addendum "G." 
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I
 h e trial court 'failed to recognize the question of fact raised by this conflicting 
testimony (i c that the canal company did not have absolute discretion to deny Roach the 
i iu ' \ Latrine ^*" permission to 
^e the canal ^ oh\uu^I\ in the sole discretion and power of the canal company " ^ nr 
with respect u- n - ^ -eniL-j are not absoli 
'mere is no presumed grant of a right to exercise the tv it 
in an unnecessary and unreasonable manner. The right t 
easement owner and the right of the land owner are no* 
absolute, irrelative and uncontrolled, but are so limited, oach by 
the other, that there may be a due and reasonable enjoyment .*f 
both 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moylc, 11A P.2d 148, 158 (Utah 1946) (citations 
omittedV '"Each owner must exercise his right so as not unreasonably to intend. .\ -.\ ;.ie 
other.' " wit Lake City v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 253 P.2d 365, 370 (Utah 1953) 
(quoting the Big Cottonwood case). 
The reciprocal rights of a land o i nei and canal ow nei i eqi lire a canal ow ner 
to give a reasonable justification before denying a land OWT„ r the ru:m to access his land. 
1 
testified that the canal company purportedly refused i- A\U> • R^adi i. Tu:*:e uu .anal 
because "[p]revious attempts to bridge the canal, even \ ... „ JL .: , JIHL, .
 r _;•. 
have resulted in damage to the banks and the canal lining." R. 31. 
s:\bdr\33457 15 
Mr. Hallam's testimony, however, is insufficient for the purpose of granting 
summary judgment. It gives no indication as to the degree of damage suffered as the result 
of these previous attempts or why the same damage should be expected to occur on Roach's 
property. In other words, it fails to establish a reasonable basis, as a matter of law, for 
denying Roach the right to bridge the canal. Therefore, summary judgment should have 
been denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The record below and the arguments presented herein demonstrate that 
Roach's motion for summary judgment should have been denied. Roach's failure to comply 
with CJA Rule 4-501(2)(a) was fatal to his motion. Even if it were not fatal, there was no 
reasonable necessity for the requested easement, or, at the very least, there was a question of 
fact as to whether it was reasonably necessary. Finally, the evidence was insufficient to 
determine, as a matter of law, whether the canal company's alleged denial of Roach's right 
to bridge the canal was reasonable. Accordingly, the trial court's Order and Judgment 
should be reversed. 
DATED this J T ^ day of August, 1994. 
Bruce D. Reemsnyder ' 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
s \bdr\33457 16 
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Provo, Utah 34603 
ff^LLU^. (JJ _ [/ {JUTAS^^AJULSU' *±A^JLA-^ U ^ 
s - v : i4^7 

JOHN L. VALENTINE (3310), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Our File No. 21,015 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL , . M - , ^ COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
P-M-I I ROACH, 
Plai-
s 
DEANNE R. JE] - [. 
Defendant 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 920400425 • 
Hon. Ray M Harding 
Pla intiffs Motion for Summar\ hnl, un.nl having ban heai ill hi Ion1 this ' i mi I the 
Honorable Ra> M. Hardin* "-aiding, and the matter having been argued b\ .Wfc_ 
counsel, and affidavits and memoranda having been filed, the Court's Memorandum Decision 
for further hearing before the Honorable Ray 
M. Harding on August 24, i^M, to clarify the location of the easement. The Court entered its 
Memorano 
now makes the following Order and Judgi nei it: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED and judgment is granted to the plaintiff as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is granted an easement by implication and by necessity over 
defendant's land as more fully described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
2. Plaintiff has established the element of an easement by implication as set forth 
in Butler v. Lee. 774 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), being (a) a unity of title before 
severance; (b) the servitude was apparent; (c) the easement was reasonably necessary; and (d) 
the use of the easement was continuous. 
3. I^fendanfs affidavit that plaintiff built a bridge across the canal and has used 
it for the past year for access to his property is inadequate to refute the affidavit of J. Merrill 
Hallam that the canal company refuses to allow plaintiff permission to build a bridge across the 
canal. 
4. Defendant's statement in her affidavit that there are numerous bridges across 
the canal is irrelevant and immaterial. 
5. The fact that other bridges may have been built across the canal is insufficient 
to support any allegation that the canal company would permit plaintiff to bridge the canal to 
allow him access to his property. 
6. Without permission from the canal company to bridge the canal, the plaintiffs 
property is truly "land-locked." 
2 
110 
7. .casement across defendant's property is consistent with historic access and is 
reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of plaintiffs land-locked parcel and wil, tx ^ least 
diMiiptni in IIH 'lefrndants piopcrty. 
DATED t h i s / ^ day of Febftiarjr, 1994. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
JdlL > ^ ^/^L^^ 
M. BYRON FISHER, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant 
BY THE COURT 
HARDING 
ICT COURT JUDG 
J:\JLV\ROACH.OR 
3 
COURT ORDERED RIGHTY-OF-WAY DESCRIPTION 
A 16.5 foot wide right-of-way for ingress and egress over the 
following described parcel of land: 
Beginning at the toe of a canal extended, which lies East 82.77 feet, 
according to Utah coordinate bearings, Central Zone, from the 
Northwest corner of Section 21, Township 8 South, Range 3 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 18°01'38" West along 
the toe of a canal embankment 267.46 feet to the Westerly line of 
the Jex property; thence South 53.32 feet along said Jex property 
line to a point 16.5 feet Southeasterly from the aforementioned toe 
of canal; thence North 18°01'38M East 323.53 feet; thence West 
17.35 feet to the point of begining. 

JOHN L. VALENTINE (3310), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
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A ^ 
Our File No. 21,015 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL J. ROACH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEANNE R. JEX, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. ROACH 
Case No. 920400425 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Paul J. Roach, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. Affiant is the plaintiff in this action. 
2. Affiant makes all of the statements in this affidavit according to personal 
knowledge. 
3. I am the owner of real property described in paragraph 5 of my complaint. 
Defendant owns property described in paragraph 6 of my complaint. See map attached hereto 
as Exhibit "1." 
4. These two pieces of property were originally one parcel held in title by my 
father, Walter Dean Roach. 
5. At his death, the single piece of property was divided into two parcels. 
6. From 1970 until my father's death, he, I and others helping us continually used 
the lane and ditch bank to access what is now my property. 
7. Defendant was at all times before the division of the property aware of the 
continual usage of the lane and ditch banks ("historical routeM marked in yellow on Ex. 1). 
8. At the time of the division of the property, the use of the historical route to 
access what would become my property was obvious and open. Defendant knew of this use, and 
made no objection to it. 
9. Defendant was aware that denial of the use of the historical route would 
landlock the smaller parcel of my property. 
10. At the time of the property division, defendant and I entered into an oral lease 
agreement under which I operated both parcels as a single parcel through the course of 
approximately ten years. During that time, I continually used the historical route to access both 
defendant's and my own property. My use of that route was continuous, open and obvious, and 
necessary to the use and enjoyment of my land. Subsequent difficulties between defendant and 
2 
myself have caused defendant to terminate the oral lease agreement and deny me access to my 
property. 
11. The irrigation company which owns the canal and a easement appurtenant 
thereto, refuses to allow new bridging efforts due to the damage they eventually cause to the 
embankments and canal itself. 
DATED this Y day of January, 1993. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4 day of January, 1993. 
mi*— MI ^r^G* r~»*i \i/*&*L«. 
JQHN/L. VALENTINE, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Notary ^(iblkr 
J20 East 30C Nor** 
Pjovo, Utah 846Cr 
My commission Expire* \ 
May 12. 1904 . 
State cf i/hj;-. ? 
3 
27 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this 1 ' day of January, 1993. 
M. Byron Fisher, Esq. 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
n:roach.aff 
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JOHN L. VALENTINE (3310), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
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Our FUc No. 21,015 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL J. ROACH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEANNE R. JEX, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 920400425 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
Plaintiff hereby submits his memorandum in support of his Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Plaintiff supplements this memorandum and statement of facts with an Affidavit of 
Paul J. Roach ("Roach Affidavit"), and an Affidavit of J. Merrill Hallam ("Hallam Affidavit"), 
filed herewith. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Plaintiff is the owner of real property located adjacent to State Road 147 near 
the City of Spanish Fork, Utah, more particularly described in plaintiffs Complaint, 1 5. 
8. During the division of the estate of Walter Dean Roach, it was apparent, 
obvious and visible that plaintiffs eastern parcel was accessed through the lane and the ditch 
bank across defendant's property. It was obvious that if plaintiff were denied the use of the lane 
and the ditch bank, the four and one-half acre parcel would become effectively landlocked. 
9. Subsequent to the division of the property, plaintiff operated the entire original 
parcel, including the portions owned by both plaintiff and defendant, as one unit under an oral 
lease agreement. This continued for the space of approximately ten years, during which plaintiff 
accessed his portions of the property and those of defendant through the historic route over 
defendant's property. 
10. Plaintiff has used the lane and ditch bank to access what is now his eastern 
parcel of property during the entire time he has owned that property as well as for an extensive 
period before the division of the original land. He has continuously used the lane and ditch bank 
during all seasons of the year in which the land can be used. 
11. Defendant terminated the lease agreement and now denies the use of the lane 
and the ditch bank on her property for any access to plaintiffs eastern parcel, which is now 
landlocked. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED WHERE NO DISPUTE 
AS TO MATERIAL FACTS EXISTS. 
Rule 56(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
crossclaim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any 
time after the expiration of twenty days from the commence-
ment of the action or after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without support-
ing affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all 
or any part thereof. 
Rule 56(c) further provides: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Commenting upon this rule, the Utah Supreme Court has noted, "A major purpose of summary 
judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings to 
determine whether there is a genuine issue to present to the fact finder." Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising. Inc. v. Lundgren. 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984). The Utah Court of Appeals has 
further noted that "[w]hen the moving party has presented evidence sufficient to support a 
judgment in its favor, and the opposing party fails to submit contrary evidence, the trial court 
4 
is justified in concluding that no genuine issue of fact is present or would be at trial." Arnica 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Other cases have emphasized that Mthe purpose of [summary judgment] is to afford a 
means for the prompt and efficient administration of justice by avoiding the time, trouble and 
expense of a trial when a trial would serve no useful purpose." Harvey v. Sanders. 534 P.2d 
905, 907 (Utah 1975). Therefore, in correct circumstances, the granting of a summary judgment 
motion is not merely proper, but necessary. As expressed in Larsen v. Christensen. 21 Utah 
2d 219, 443 P.2d 402, 403 (1968), 
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the basic and 
controlling consideration is whether there exists a genuine 
issue of fact. If none exists, it is incumbent upon the court 
to decide the matter, anent a trial, based upon the applicable 
law. 
Under this standard, plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as a matter of law should be 
granted, since no material disputes of fact exist which would warrant a trial. 
POINT II 
NO MATERIAL DISPUTE OF FACT EXISTS AS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
RIGHT TO AN EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION OVER 
DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY. 
A recent Utah case outlines in detail the necessary elements which must be proven to 
establish any easement by implication: (1) unity of title was followed by severance of title; 
(2) the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible at the time of the severance; (3) the 
easement was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; and (4) the use of 
5 
the easement was continuous. Butler v. Lee. 774 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Careful scrutiny of each of these elements in turn, coupled with an examination of the facts of 
the case at bar, indicates that each requirement has been satisfied. 
1. Unity of Title Followed by Severance. 
Initially, Butler requires unity of title followed by a severance. The original pleadings 
establish this element. Plaintiffs complaint alleges: 
7. The property of both plaintiff and defendant was 
formerly owned as one parcel in unity of title by Walter Dean 
Roach, the father of both plaintiff and defendant. 
8. After the death of Walter Dean Roach, the 
property was divided in probate between the plaintiff and 
defendant into what are now the respective parcels of both 
plaintiff and defendant. 
Defendant admits these statements are accurate. Answer, at 1 3. See also Roach Affidavit, at 
11 4-5. The original ownership of all of the property as one parcel and the subsequent division 
or "severance" are therefore undisputed. 
2. Visibility of the Servitude at Severance. 
The second Butler element requires that the servitude be apparent, obvious and visible 
at the time of the severance. Prior to his death, Walter Dean Roach, plaintiff, and others 
constantly traveled along the lane and the ditch banks to reach what is now defendant's property. 
6 
This is substantially undisputed. Roach Affidavit at 1 6; Complaint, at 1 13; Answer, at 1 8.1 
Defendant was aware of the use of this route of entrance and egress. Roach Affidavit, at 1 7. 
Subsequent to the division, plaintiff continued to use this route throughout the approximately ten 
years that he leased defendant's property. Defendant made no initial attempt to require plaintiff 
to obtain another route of entrance and egress, nor did she ever complain about the use of the 
lane and ditch bank or suggest it was unwelcome. These undisputed facts establish that the use 
was clear and obvious before, during and after the severance. 
3. Reasonable Necessity. 
The third element requires that the easement must be reasonably necessary to the 
enjoyment of the dominant estate. Utah requires only "reasonable necessity," not the "absolute 
necessity" used in other jurisdictions. Butler. 774 P.2d at 1154.2 Where an alternative access 
would be impractical or economically unfeasible, such an expenditure is not required. The 
relative positions of the effected parcels demonstrate that the claimed easement is reasonably 
1
 Defendant admits that Walter Dean Roach used the access routes and denies the access by 
"others." She does not, however, deny use by plaintiff during that time, and is therefore deemed to 
have admitted plaintiffs use. 
2
 The Butler court's discussion of this issue centered around whether a plaintiff could be 
required to restructure several storage units by removing a wooden partition in the center of a storage 
complex so as to allow alternative access to some areas. The trial court found such a restructuring 
requirement to be "impractical and economically unfeasible" and the appeals court upheld this decision 
and refused to require absolute necessity, but rather stated, "In Utah, there must be reasonable 
necessity to imply an easement . . . [and] [appellant's contention that absolute necessity is required 
in Utah to imply an easement is thus mistaken." Butler. 774 P.2d at 1154. 
7 
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necessary and that it would be impractical for plaintiff to attempt access to the smaller, eastern 
parcel from any area of ingress other than the traditional one. 
Access to the landlocked parcel is physically possible from three areas: plaintiffs own 
property (by bridging the canal), property to the south (held by two different landowners), or 
across defendant's land in the traditional path. See map attached as Exhibit "1" to Roach 
Affidavit. The last is the only reasonable alternative. The East Bench Irrigation Company 
refuses to allow a bridge to be built under any circumstances, making access from plaintiffs 
property impossible. Hallam Affidavit, at H 5-6. While it might be possible to obtain a 
southern easement across two different landowners' properties, such access would be 
cumbersome, expensive and require extensive road travel between entrances to plaintiffs two 
adjacent parcels. In contrast, the traditional pathway has provided access for more than twenty 
(20) years and no further burden would be placed on the land by its continuance. The necessity 
for the requested easement is thus established as the only reasonable alternative. 
4. Continuous Use. 
The final element required to establish an easement by implication is that the use be of 
a continuous rather than sporadic nature. Butler. 774 P.2d at 1152. Such is the case here. 
Plaintiff was intimately involved in the use of the land well before the death of his father. 
Roach Affidavit, at 1 6. During the subsequent ten year period in which he leased the land from 
defendant, he used the easement whenever necessary. Roach Affidavit, at 1 10. At no 
significant time period has plaintiff abandoned the use of the easement. At no time has 
8 
defendant attempted—until her recent refusal to allow plaintiff to use the property—to interfere 
with in any way plaintiffs use of the easement. Plaintiffs actions constitute the required 
"continuous use" in both the common and legal sense of the phrase. 
In sum, each of the elements of an easement by implication have been shown. No 
material facts exist which would dispute plaintiffs right to an easement over defendant's 
property in the historical path from State Road 147, down the lane and along the ditch bank. 
Plaintiff should be granted an easement along that pathway of sufficient width to allow passage 
of farm machinery in the same manner as has been historically true. 
POINT III 
NO MATERIAL DISPUTE OF FACT EXISTS AS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
RIGHT TO AN EASEMENT BY NECESSITY OVER DEFENDANT'S 
PROPERTY. 
The most recent Utah case to discuss easement by necessity is Tschaggeny v. Union 
Pacific Land Resources Corp.. 555 P.2d 277 (Utah 1976). In that case, the court outlined two 
main requirements to obtain an easement by necessity: 
(1) Unity of title followed by a severance, and 
(2) The easement must be reasonably necessary 
to the enjoyment of the dominant estate. 
9 
Id. at 280.3 Where these two elements are met by the particular circumstances of a case, the 
court will grant an easement unless it clearly appears that the parties to the conveyance did not 
intend that such an easement be created. The particular language of the case states: 
On the other hand, a way of necessity arises when there is a 
conveyance of part of a tract of land which is so situated that 
either the part conveyed or the part retained is surrounded 
with no access to a road to the outer world. In either case, 
there is an implied grant or reservation of a way across the 
park, not so surrounded, unless it clearly appears that the 
parties to the conveyance did not intend such an easement. 
However, it is not necessary that the easement be visible, 
apparent, or obvious. 
Tschaggeny. 555 P.2d at 280-81. The elements needed to establish this type of 
easement are less stringent than those required to establish an easement by implication. The 
relaxed standard indicates the importance of allowing access to parcels of land which would be 
landlocked otherwise, unless the parties, for some unfathomable reason, make a conscious choice 
to landlock a parcel. The parties had no such intent here, making an easement appropriate. 
1. Unity of Title and Severance. 
As noted above, unity of title to the present parcels was held by Walter Dean Roach and 
later by his estate. During the probate process, the original parcel was split into two adjoining 
3
 Tschaggeny discusses the earlier case of Savage v. Nielsen. 114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117 
(1948). That case contained elements of both an easement by prescription and necessity, and the court 
eliminated requirements of (1) obviousness and (2) continual, self-acting use as having to do with 
rights of prescription only. Tschaggeny. 555 P.2d at 280. 
10 
1 
parcels, with a portion going to plaintiff and defendant. Defendant admits this unity of title and 
severance. Answer at 1 3. The first Tschaggeny requirement is thus fulfilled. 
2. Reasonable Necessity. 
The discussion of reasonable necessity, supra, outlines the circumstances and reasonable 
nature of plaintiffs request. Again, as noted above, the necessity requirement applicable to 
easements in this state is "reasonable" and not "absolute" necessity. See Butler v. Lee. 774 P.2d 
1150 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The dominant estate with which this litigation concerns itself is 
plaintiffs eastern parcel of approximately 4 1/2 acres, which is divided from plaintiffs other 
parcel by a 15-foot canal. That parcel is "so situated that either the part conveyed or the part 
retained is surrounded with no access to a road to the outer world." Tschaggeny. 555 P.2d at 
280. The Irrigation Company that owns the canal will not allow a bridge to be built, even to 
exacting specifications. Hallam Affidavit at 11 5-6. Further, were the Company to allow the 
bridge, requiring plaintiff to make such an expensive improvement would not be reasonable. 
The cost of such a bridging effort would comprise a substantial portion of the worth of the entire 
eastern parcel, and would constitute a waste of resources which could easily be avoided. An 
easement from the south creates similar, unnecessary costs and difficulties. Access to the 
eastern portion currently exists across defendant's land by a pathway which has been freely used 
for more than of twenty (20) years. No new burden would be placed upon the land by granting 
the easement by necessity nor would defendant suffer any new or excessive injury. These are 
clearly facts from which an easement by necessity may be comfortably established. 
11 
A final reference to Tschaggeny should be made: no "clear proof1 that the parties to 
the conveyance did not intend such an easement can be shown. Sgg Tschaggeny. 555 P.2d at 
280-81. The grantor-the estate of Walter Dean Roach-made no attempt to deny such an 
easement. The instrument of conveyance did not specifically provide for access or denial of 
access to the eastern parcel. Defendant made no objection at that time, nor did she make 
subsequent efforts to deny access to the parcel until just prior to the initiation of this litigation. 
It simply never occurred to either party that the issue would ever come up, or at a minimum, 
it was certainly not clear that the parties wished to landlock the eastern parcel. These 
circumstances place plaintiffs request well within the parameters of Tschaggeny. because no 
"clear proof exists that either party disfavored the easement. 
Based upon the circumstances and action of the parties at the time of the conveyance, 
an easement by necessity is appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has shown by uncontroverted facts that the requirements for an easement by 
implication have been met. He has further shown that the requirements for an easement by 
necessity along the same pathway are met. The court is therefore requested to grant either or 
both of the claimed easements along the historical routes used by plaintiff and plaintiffs 
predecessor in interest in accessing plaintiffs landlocked eastern parcel. 
12 
DATED this 4m day of January, 1993. 
wLA^ 6r*^ 
VALENTINE, for: 
>, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this day of January, 1993. 
M. Byron Fisher, Esq. 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
n roftch mem 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL J. ROACH, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NUMBER: 920400425 
vs. 
DEANNE R. JEX, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Defendant. 
Having received and considered plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgement, together 
with memoranda and affidavits both in support and in opposition to the motion, and having 
heard the oral arguments of counsel in this matter, the Court hereby grants the motion. The 
Court finds that plaintiff has fully established all necessary elements of both an easement by 
implication and an easement by necessity. Defendant has failed to preserve any genuine 
issue of material fact regarding the validity of plaintiffs easement over defendant's land. 
Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to judgement in his favor as a matter of law pursuant to 
Rule56U.R.C.P.. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recognized the elements necessary to constitute an 
easement by implication as follows: 
(1) that unity of title was followed by severance; (2) that the servitude was apparent, 
obvious, and visible at the time of severance; (3) that the easement was reasonably 
necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; and (4) that the use of the 
easement was continuous rather than sporadic. 
Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing Ovard v. Cannon. 600 P.2d 
1246, 1247 (Utah 1979); Chournos v. Alkema. 27 Utah 2d 244, 494 P.2d 950, 952 (1972); 
and Southland Corp. v. Potter. 760 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). The elements of 
an easement by necessity as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Tschaggenv v. Union 
Pacific Land Resources Corp.. 555 P.2d 277 (1976), are apparently identical to those 
required for an easement by implication in Utah. 
In his Statement of Undisputed Facts, plaintiff has set forth facts sufficient to establish 
each element as noted above. Each factual assertion is supported by specific reference to 
affidavits and deposition testimony. In response, defendant has failed to adequately or 
competently refute any of plaintiffs material allegations of fact establishing his right of way. 
Her "Statement of Facts" is wholly unsupported by any reference to the record. 
Furthermore, in her Statement of Facts, plaintiff admits the first required element, i.e., unity 
of title followed by severance, and fails to set forth any specific facts to contradict the 
assertion that the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible at the time of severance, or 
that the use of the easement was continuous rather than sporadic. Therefore, pursuant to 
Rule 4-501 (2)(b) of the Code of Judicial Administration, plaintiffs assertions of fact relating 
to the second and fourth elements cited above must also be deemed admitted. 
Defendant's only factual assertions that specifically contradict those of the plaintiff 
relate to the third element of an easement by implication or necessity, i.e., that the easement 
was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate. Defendant alleges that 
"Plaintiff has access to his property by bridging the canal and does not have any necessity to 
use defendant's property." Although her allegation is, again, unsupported by any reference 
to the record, as indicated in the introductory paragraph of defendant's memorandum, she 
relies in general on the her own affidavit and the affidavit of J. Merrill Hallam. However, 
Mr. Hallam's affidavit serves to conclusively refute defendant's position. Mr. Hallam has 
testified under oath and based on his personal knowledge as president of the East Bench 
Irrigation Company that the company "refuses to allow plaintiff permission to build a bridge 
across the canal," and that it "has never given permission to plaintiff to build a bridge across 
the canal." 
In light of the foregoing testimony, defendant's own affidavit is simply inadequate. 
She asserts that "the canal has been bridged in numerous locations" and that "as long as my 
brother meets the permit requirements, he can bridge the canal for access to his property . . 
." However, the defendant has failed to establish any foundation for her testimony as it 
relates to any material issue in this case. The fact that other bridges may have been built 
across the canal at other locations, with or without the permission of the irrigation company, 
is irrelevant and immaterial. (The affidavit of defendant's husband regarding the existence of 
other bridges is similarly irrelevant and immaterial.) Furthermore, the fact that other bridges 
may have been built is insufficient to support any personal knowledge of the alleged 
willingness of the canal company to permit plaintiff in this instance to bridge the canal at any 
location which would allow him to access his property presently at issue. 
The granting of permission to bridge the canal is obviously in the sole discretion and 
power of the irrigation company. The president of that company has refused to give such 
permission by way of personal affidavit. Defendant has offered no foundation to support any 
personal knowledge that the company's disposition is to the contrary. Without the 
permission of the irrigation company, plaintiff is left with no alternative legal access to the 
parcel of property in question. His parcel is truly "landlocked." Because defendant has 
failed to offer competent testimony to refute the assertion of plaintiffs inability to obtain the 
irrigation company's permission to bridge the canal, the court must conclude that an 
easement across defendant's property, consistent with historical access, is reasonably 
necessary for the enjoyment of plaintiffs otherwise landlocked parcel. 
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision 
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval 
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no 
effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 21st day of April, 1993. 
cc: M. Byron Fisher, Esq. 
John L. Valentine, Esq. 
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M. Byron Fisher 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL J. ROACH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEANNE R. JEX, 
Defendant. 
No. 920400425 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN JEX 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
) 
: ss 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, BRYAN JEX, upon oath depose and say: 
1. I am the husband of defendant, Deanne R. Jex. 
2. I know plaintiff Paul Roach, and I am acquainted 
with the property of these two individuals which is adjacent to 
the East Bench Canal near Spanish Fork, Utah. 
S:\mbf\8417 
3. During the past year, Paul Roach has used a bridge 
across the East Bench Canal and a lateral of the canal to fc*rm 
his land on the east side of the canal. 
4. During the past year, Paul Roach has not used any 
claimed right-of-way on Deanne R. Jex's property to reach his 
property. 
5. The attached photograph*wsws taken by me, which 
accurately depicts the bridge across the East Bench Canal which 
is used by Paul Roach to farm both parcels of his property, and I 
have personally seen him use this bridge with his farming 
equipment. 
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of March, 1993. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ^ /) day of 
March, 1993. 
r .. 
N o t a r y 'Publ ios 7, /? J __ , 
Residing ^Xlli£fo0tf}U(U 
-2 -
s:\mbf\8417 
69 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~2 * day of March, 1993, 
I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN JEX, to: 
John L. Valentine, Esq. 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84603 
.//^  l A ^ / / ^ w ^ 
S:\rabf\8417 
-3-

*TF 
hdll l/usiirss 
M. Byron Fisher 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL J. ROACH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEANNE R. JEX, 
Defendant. 
No. 920400425 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE R. JEX 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
) 
: ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, DEANNE R. JEX, upon oath depose and say: 
1. I am the defendant in the above-entitled action. 
2. I am an heir of the estate of Walter Dean Roach, as 
is my brother, Paul R. Roach, the plaintiff in this proceeding. 
3. In November, 1981, the estate of my father, Walter 
Dean Roach, was distributed between me and my brother. My 
brother indicated the portion of the properties of the estate 
s \mbf\3279 
that he desired, and I took the remainder, which we both believed 
was an equal distribution of the real property of the estate. 
4. My brother knew the property which he took from the 
estate. He had worked that property as a farmer with my father 
for a number of years. 
5. At the time the estate was divided, my brother made 
no claims upon my property for rights-of-way, access or easement, 
and has never made a claim against my property for access, 
rights-of-way or easement. 
6. The East Bench Irrigation Company has permitted 
bridging across its canal in numerous locations and as long as my 
brother meets the permit requirements, he can bridge the canal 
for access to his property from Utah Route 147 through his 
property and across the canal to his adjacent property. 
7. In addition, my brother owns adjacent property to 
that which was divided to him in the estate and has access to all 
of his property through property of his own. 
8. The statement of J. Merrill Hallam as president of 
the East Bench Irrigation Company that the canal has never been 
bridged is an improper and inaccurate statement, as the canal has 
been bridged in numerous locations along the canal right-of-way. 
s:\mbf\3279 
- 2 -
DATED this 31 day of January, 1993. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before roe this ^/ day of 
January, 1993. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary P u b l i c J ^ 
Residing at; ,y^ AHJ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/., 
I hereby certify that on this jO day of danuagyf 
1993, I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE R. JEX, to: 
John L. Valentine, Esq. 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84 603 
~~>i^ ? CZ^ akdZs 
n 
s:\mbf\3279 
- 3 -

JOHN L. VALENTINE (3310), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
v. J 
•k :
'H , 
Our File No. 21,015 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL J. ROACH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEANNE R. JEX, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF J. MERRILL 
HALLAM 
Case No. 920400425 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
J. Merrill Hallam, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. Affiant is not a party to this action. 
2. Affiant makes all of the statements in this affidavit according to personal 
knowledge. 
3. I am the President of the East Bench Irrigation Company, a Utah Irrigation 
Company. 
4. The Company owns the canal which crosses plaintiff and defendant's property, 
as well as certain easements appurtenant thereto. 
5. The Company refuses to allow plaintiff permission to build a bridge across the 
canal. Previous attempts to bridge the canal, even when done according to specifications, have 
resulted in damage to the banks and the canal lining. 
6. The Company has never given permission to plaintiff to build a bridge across 
the canal, nor has it ever indicated to any party to this action that it would allow a bridge to be 
built. 
DATED this ' ^ day of December, 1992. 
J. l^rrill Hallam 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / 3 - day of December, 1992. 
I NOTARY PUBLIC 
n:roach2.aff 
2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this M day of January, 1993. 
M. Byron Fisher, Esq. 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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